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Abstract		
The present paper constitutes an analysis of a combination of factors, which have 
contributed to the global financial crisis of 2007. The writer elaborates on, first, an 
indicative list of financial products associated with problematic results; second, the 
excessive risk taking from the part of professionals running major financial institutions; 
third, the threat imposed by excessive risk taking not only to individual financial 
institutions but also to the financial system as a whole. With this combination of factors 
in mind, the aim, at the conclusion of this work, is a proposed approach on both a 
procedural and a substantial framework for the liability of professionals undertaking 
excessive financial risk. 
 
Sonia I. Saranti 
08.09.2015 
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“Liberty not only means that the 
individual has both the opportunity 
and the burden of choice; it also 
means that he must bear the 
consequences of his actions. Liberty 
and responsibility are inseparable”. 
 
Friedrich Hayek (1899-1992)
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I. Introduction 
It is undisputed that the financial crisis of 2007 onwards did not come out of the 
blue. This dissertation aims to present, first, the risky financial products and practices 
introduced in the financial markets; second, the role of those running the financial 
institutions with regard to those products and practices; third, the interconnection 
between those two factors and the extent to which they led to or amplified the effects 
of the crisis of 2007. Those factors are addressed, first, in order to discuss the 
situation; second, in order to develop a proposed liability mechanism for the decision 
makers of financial institutions, in case they unreasonably contribute to the cause of 
financial problems. 
It goes without saying that the economic situation of big financial institutions 
affects the overall economy. With this thought in mind, summarised in the notion of 
the interconnection of the world of finance, the area of study – as described in the first 
paragraph of this paper – has been chosen for a specific reason: the lessons learned 
from the financial crisis, with regard to the functions of the stakeholders of the 
market, can assist with the avoidance of the same mistakes, consequently of the same 
catastrophic results. The facts need to be underlined, as it can be argued that markets 
have no memory.1 This is indeed true and this is the reason why, despite the liberal 
approach flourished within this dissertation, it is sustained that one cannot rely on the 
market stakeholders’ adjustment to the new circumstances, which have arisen due to 
bad choices. Rather, effective proactive mechanisms are required so that any 
problems can be avoided.  
The writer is going to indicate the way and the reasons why the problematic 
policies and products were introduced in the market and the reason why the risks 
associated with them were undertaken in a considerably speculative, if not reckless 
manner. All those could be fairly summed up with the notion of ‘getting rich quick’, 
as the wrong incentive provided to those running the financial institutions.2 In fact, 
the designers, issuers and traders of extremely risky products managed to get great 
																																																								
1 Brealey R. A. & Myers S. C, Principles of Corporate Finance (6th edition, Irwin McGraw-Hill, USA, 
2000), p. 368 
2 Persaud Avinash, Reinventing Financial Regulation; A Blueprint for Overcoming Systemic Risk 
(Apress, New York, 2015), p. 162 
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bonuses,3 despite any proven malfunctioning or disastrous effects of their initiatives 
for the financial institutions individually, but also for the global economy overall.  
As for the notion of financial institutions, due to the fact that the writer aims at 
presenting real life examples on how the situation evolved, special reference will be 
made to specific insurance companies, banks etc. It is underlined, though, that the 
situation evolved in more or less a similar pattern for the majority of financial 
institutions that faced difficulties and either recovered or can now be found only in 
the books of financial history and cases analyses.  
As for some necessary terminological clarifications, it is of fundamental 
importance to underline at the beginning of this work that the terms day-to-day 
policymakers or decision makers have been chosen in order to refer to any people 
running financial institutions, in the sense of being able to make decisions and 
undertake risks. The aim of this choice is to avoid the restriction in terms, such as 
executive boards, managers etc., which may reflect the way of decision making in 
certain jurisdictions, but this is not how the system works everywhere. The idea for 
the use of this terminology was taken by the Dutch Regulation Governing 
Remuneration Policy, 4  which partially incorporated the Capital Requirements 
Directive III, 2010/76/EU in the Dutch legal framework.5 
As a final introductory remark, it is stressed that the majority of sources used are 
contemporary sources, i.e. from 2008 onwards. The reason of this choice is that the 
issues addressed refer to the very recent financial history. However, when 
comparisons with policies of the past are made, or when well established for years 
legal and financial concepts are recalled, relevant long-standing bibliography is as 
well used. 
																																																								
3 Chorafas Dimitrios N., Financial Bloom and Gloom; The Credit and Banking Crisis of 2007-2009 
and Beyond (Palgrave Macmillan, England, 2009), p. 160 
4 Regeling beheerst beloningsbeleid Wft 2011 
5 Kromwijk D. M. & Oostwouder W. J., ‘Variable Remuneration and Dutch State Aid: Is a Legal 
Framework Necessary and/or Wrongful?’ (2011) Vol. 8, No. 5 European Company Law, p. 217 
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II. The Problematic Character of Selected Financial Products 
A. Introductory Notes 
This section describes, first a selected list of the products and policies misused 
within the years leading to the financial crisis; second, concrete examples of financial 
institutions, which suffered severely by the effects of those products and policies and, 
third, the criticism on the risks inherent in the involvement with highly risky 
investments, like the products and policies herein analysed. It needs to be stressed that 
the list of products and, thereafter, financial institutions in trouble examined is 
indicative and non-exhaustive. The scope of this dissertation is an illustration of the 
problem, based on the function of some of the circulated products and policies. This 
illustration indicates the coherence between the role of decision makers and their 
subsequent liability. 
B. Speculative Financial Products & Practices 
The reason for choosing to present the following products and practices is that, 
despite the initial celebration towards their issuing, when their long-term results came 
up, they were accused of either amplifying or causing the crisis.6 Indeed, many other 
products were accused of causing similar results, however, this indicative list enables 
the identification of the problem.  
As for the notion ‘speculative’ chosen in this section, it needs to be underlined 
that the use of those products and practices as such is not necessarily speculative. 
What made it speculative was the choice of those running the institutions to use them 
in a way, which, although maximising the short-term financial results of the 
institutions, was disastrous in the long-term.  
1. Identification 
a) Securities Lending 
One of the most problematic procedures, wherein financial institutions were 
involved, was the so-called securities lending transactions. Within those transactions, 
one of the parties lends its securities, whereas the borrower deposits collateral – 																																																								
6 Johnson S. & Kwak J., ‘Is Financial Innovation Good for the Economy?’ (2012) Vol. 12, No. 1 
Innovation Policy and the Economy, p. 1
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primarily cash – with the lender;7 the title to and ownership of the securities are 
transferred to the borrower. Institutions get involved in securities lending in order to 
further develop the yield of their securities portfolios.8 
Typically, the market value of the securities is lower than the cash provided to the 
lender. This is called: overcollateralisation of the loan provided.9 This process, and 
especially the case when overcollateralisation is excessive, causes great concerns for 
the financial system overall. In fact, it exposes collateral providers to greater risks 
than they can probably bear, whereas the systemic stability is as well threatened,10 
given the high levels of interconnection of the financial stakeholders. In this context, 
the relevance of the contagion effect as a key component of systemic risk within the 
financial market has been a topic of considerable discussion after the recent financial 
crisis.11 
In particular, the problematic situation with securities lending can arise when the 
borrower decides to return the securities. In this case, the lender shall return the 
collateral (cash, in most cases); which, in turn, means that the lender should be able to 
return that collateral. However, this collateral has been invested and there is the 
chance that the capital along with the return of the investment of the collateral is not 
at the hands of the lender; hence the latter cannot give it back to the borrower. This 
notion is shortly described as “potential liquidity risk exposure”.12  
Among the main lenders of securities in those transactions are insurance 
companies.13 A concrete example of how those transactions and the liquidity risk 
exposure they entail, had – almost – catastrophic effects for an insurance company, 
AIG, due to “false forecasts” is submitted below14. One of the primary reasons why 																																																								
7 McDonald R. & Paulson An., ‘AIG in Hindsight’ (2015) Vol. 29, No. 2 The Journal of Economic 
Perspectives, p. 84 
8 Adrian Tobias et al. ‘Repo and Securities Lending’, Federal Reserve Bank of New York; Staff 
Reports, Staff Report No. 529 (December 2011 – Revised February 2013), p. 7 
9 Copeland M. et al., ‘Repo Runs: Evidence from the Tri-Party Repo Market’, Federal Reserve Bank of 
New York; Staff Reports, Staff Report No. 506 (July 2011 – Revised August 2014), p. 11 
10 Keijser Thomas et al., ‘Financial Collateral: From Private to Regulatory Law Reform’, in Keijser 
Thomas (ed.), Transnational Securities Law (Oxford University Press, USA, 2014), p. 54 
11 See indicatively Lastra Rosa M., International Financial and Monetary Law (2nd edition, Oxford 
University Press, USA, 2015), Chapter 4 
12 Adrian Tobias et al. (2013), n 8, p. 7 
13 Ibid., p. 7 
14 Section II.C.1 
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securities lending led to the negative results known today for institutions such as AIG, 
was the excessive pure speculation for the cash collateral reinvested by the financial 
institutions, which led to substantial mismatching between asset and liability.15 In 
fact, it should be underlined that the provision of such collateral, either in the form of 
money or in the form of transferrable securities, constitutes one of the major 
components for the financial markets – and primarily the wholesale financial markets 
– to function.16 However – as a further justification of the notion “speculative”  – 
special attention is required when the holder of the collateral uses it to make profit. 
A final remark, regarding how the problematic situation with this practice 
evolved prior to the crisis, refers to the US securities lending market in 2008. In 
particular, the lenders reduced the amount of securities they were willing to lend for a 
certain amount of collateral and asked for more compensation for collateral entailing 
greater risk.17 This even more underlines the uncertainty realised within excessively 
risky initiatives the years leading to the financial crisis. 
b) Repurchase Agreements (Repos) 
Repos is another story of crucial importance within the context under 
examination, since repos constitute one of the principal means of financing for 
financial institutions in jurisdictions such as the USA. A repo is a sale of securities, 
along with the promise that the securities will be repurchased at a specific time in the 
future and at a certain price. The similarity between repos and securities lending is 
apparent: in the case of securities lending we have the lending of securities followed 
by a reverse transaction, whereas in repos, the securities are sold, in order to be 
repurchased at a specific price and at a later date.18 
The differentiation between the bilateral and the tri-party repo transactions is of 
crucial importance in the context of the present work, given that their results within 
the last financial crisis were considerably different. Their difference lies with the fact 																																																								
15 Adrian Tobias et al. (2013), n 8, p. 10 
16 Keijser Thomas et al. (2014), n 10, p. 28; Ong K. & Yeung E., ‘Repos and Securities Lending: The 
Accounting Arbitrage and their Role in the Global Financial Crisis’ (2010) Vol. 6, No. 1 Capital 
Markets Law Journal, p. 92 
17 Fleming Michael J. et al., ‘Repo Market Effects on the Term Securities Lending Facility’ (2010) Vol. 
100, No. 2 The American Economic Review, Papers and Proceedings of the One Hundred Twenty 
Second Annual Meeting of the American Economic Association, p. 591 
18 Ong & Yeung (2010), n 16, p. 92 
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that in the case of bilateral repos, the two trading parties perform all the transactions 
involved. In tri-party repos, on the other hand, a third party undertakes the settlements 
and the collateral management.19 The two kinds of transactions are similar as to the 
contractual details of the repurchase agreements and companies use both of them in 
order to furnish their financial needs.20 
The repo market is one of the markets entailing great risk, as indicated by their 
recent results, despite that repos are considered as a by definition low risk investment, 
forming short-term investments with predictable results. It is submitted that – as 
proven by the modern financial history herein addressed – this market is risky, due to 
the fact that whether or not it will experience losses depends on multiple factors. 
Thus, those involved or those running the companies involved should be very 
attentive not only regarding the quality of collateral provided for particular securities, 
but also, for example, regarding the creditworthiness the securities lenders confer on 
their counterparties, when, especially, a tri-party – but also to some extent a bilateral 
party – repo market is involved.21 
In the case of bilateral repo transactions, important losses were experienced in 
early 2008, due to an increase in the reduction of value (haircut) of all or some of the 
collateral classes. A run was experienced, because a smaller amount of cash could be 
raised from borrowers holding a particular amount of securities, leading them to de-
lever.22 In fact, the increase of haircuts was the response of the securities’ lenders 
against their fear regarding the value of collateral they received or the 
creditworthiness of their counterparties.23  
An asset (securities) class can as well experience a haircut.24 In the USA, even at 
the outset of the worst financial crisis in history25 many hedge funds and shadow 
banks went bankrupt, due to their exposure to the bilateral repo market and their 
inability to meet margin calls by reason of large asset class haircuts.26  																																																								
19 Copeland et al. (2014), n 9 
20 Ibid., p. 4 
21 Adrian et al. (2013), n 8, p. 8 
22 Ibid., p. 8 
23 Fleming et al. (2010), n 17, p. 592 
24 Adrian Tobias et al. (2010), n 8, p. 8 
25 Chodorow-Reich G., ‘Effects of Unconventional Monetary Policy on Financial Institutions’ (2014) 
Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, p. 156 
26 Adrian et al. (2013), n 8, p. 9 
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No haircut increase can be problematic as well. This seems to have happened in 
the case of Lehman Brothers, analysed below27. In particular, a financial institution, 
relying on repo market transactions for funding its operations, may be forced into 
bankruptcy, in case its creditors refuse to continue financing its repos.28 
Despite these observations, though, it has been sustained that especially the tri-
party repos – as compared to and unlike the bilateral – did not contribute to the 
financial meltdown under examination, since no system-wide run on the tri-party repo 
market has been identified.29 
c) Subprime Loans 
The lending to subprime borrowers, a category of borrowers primarily for home 
mortgages, was another speculative act focusing only on short-term results. 30 Those 
borrowers could not meet the requirements to take out a loan, on the basis of the 
regular requirements set by rational lenders, such as their income, credit history, their 
payment to income ratio and loan to value ratio.31 However, they were given loans, 
since the above-mentioned factors were not observed to the extent necessary. Banks 
and other lenders considered them as a very profitable market,32 because they were 
penalising subprime borrowers’ weak creditworthiness by charging higher interest 
rates. This trend led to a very high interconnection between financial institutions, 
which were large purchasers of securities backed by subprime assets.33 
Even before the outburst of the financial crisis, the dangers for those investing in 
those loans or the securities associated with subprime loans were more or less known. 
In fact, investment in residential mortgage loans entails four main risks: i) the credit 
risk, associated with the default of the home owner; ii) the liquidity risk, since 
mortgage loans tend to be considerably illiquid; iii) the price risk, according to the 
flows in the market of interest rates; and iv) the prepayment risk, when borrowers 																																																								
27 Section II.C.2 
28 Adrian et al. (2013), n 8, p. 8 
29 Copeland et al. (2014), n 9, p. 2 
30 Arora Anu, ‘The corporate governance failings in financial institutions and directors' legal liability’ 
(2011) Vol. 32, No. 1 Company Lawyer (2011), p. 3 
31 Fabozzi Frank J. et al, Foundations of Financial Markets and Institutions (3rd edition, Prentice Hall, 
USA, 2002), p. 427 
32 Schooner H. M. & Taylor M. W., Global Bank Regulation; Principles and Policies (Elsevier, USA, 
2010), p. 45 
33 Ibid., p. 7 
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repay the loans earlier than the maturity date, which deprives lenders from their right 
on the remaining interest rates payments.34 Based on this multifactorial risk, inherent 
in investing in this kind of mortgage loans, one cannot but preview the multiplication 
of those risks when it comes to subprime residential mortgage loans. Hence, any 
harmful effects, which easily one could have predicted, actually resulted in a 
contagion result with serious effects for the global economy.  
In fact, the losses of this category’s loan portfolios exceeded massively any 
assumptions made by both the creators of those loans’ securities, as well as of the 
credit rating agencies. Consequently, as the loans backing the securities started to go 
bad, the value of those securities declined sharply.35 As the securities for those loans 
almost disappeared, the assets were valued at a very large discount compared to their 
face value.36 
d) Credit Default Swaps (CDSs) 
In simple terms, CDSs (or as Warren Buffet called them ‘the financial weapons of 
mass destruction’37) constitute an insurance of a loan in case of default of the 
borrower.38 These derivatives provide for the ability of banks to be protected against 
the non-payment of a loan by the conclusion of the contract that reimburses them in 
case of failure of the borrower to meet his obligations – this is the reason why the 
term insurance is used.  
 It is sustained that these financial products were among the major factors having 
contributed to the contagion of the financial crisis and, in this sense, it is crucial that 
they were provided in the context of very lightly regulated parts of the financial 
market.39 By lightly regulated markets, the reference is primarily made to Over-The-
Counter (OTC) Markets, where the products are traded through a dealer network and 
not through a centralised exchange, where stricter rules apply.  
The importance of those instruments becomes even more apparent on the basis of 
the fact that, within a system of financial institutions being too big to fail, as in the 																																																								
34 Fabozzi et al. (2002), n 31, p. 440 
35 Schooner & Taylor (2010), n 32, p. 46 
36 Ibid., p. 46 
37 Alloway Tracy, ‘Why Would Anyone Want to Restart the Credit Default Swaps Market; Saving 
single-name credit default swaps?’ (May 11, 2015), Bloomberg Business 
38 Johnson & Kwak (2012), n 6, p. 5 
39 Schooner & Taylor (2010), n 32, p. 47 
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case of AIG below40, CDSs were used as means for the achievement of better ratings 
for subprime backed securities.41 In fact, when the value of the mortgage-related 
securities started to deteriorate, the investors having written CDS protection on those 
securities found themselves responsible to pay hundreds of millions for the CDS 
contracts they had sold;42 the most illustrative example is AIG. Investors – including 
AIG – were, in most of the cases, not fully able to assess the risks inherent, due to the 
structure of the contracts and misleading ratings. In fact, the CDSs were priced on 
models, based on data for risk assessment when the default rate was considerably 
low.43 
C. Effects of the Products – Concrete Examples  
The aim of this subsection is to provide concrete examples of financial 
institutions having been highly exposed to speculative financial products or policies, 
as the ones discussed under Section II.B of this paper. The results of this exposure are 
illustrative of how bad decisions led to the financial meltdown. Those institutions are 
examples of how the problem evolved, however, there are many similar institutions 
that could indicate and substantiate the same argument: exposure to excessive risk and 
high leverage caused a complete financial mess.  
1. American International Group (AIG) 
The rescue of the insurance colossus AIG constitutes a landmark incident for the 
history of the US Treasury. The procedure of this rescue officially started on 
September 16, 2008 and lasted for years.44 This paper presents the most serious part 
of this story, which refers to the roots of the problem, i.e. why this huge company 
with $1 trillion in assets was in need of assistance so as not to go bankrupt. 
In broad terms, it is sustained that two activities were the main reasons why the 
company was led almost to its closure: first, its securities lending business and 
second, its CDS business.45 Both caused losses of similar magnitude.  																																																								
40 Section II.C.1 
41 Schooner & Taylor (2010), n 32, p. 47 
42 Alloway (2015), n 37 
43 Johnson S. & Kwak J. (2012), n 6, p. 5 
44  REUTERS, ‘TIMELINE-The government's rescue and sale of AIG’ (September 9, 2012), 
reuters.com 
45 McDonald & Paulson (2015), n 7, p. 81 
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To begin with the problem associated with the securities lending, the situation 
unfolded as follows. Before the financial crisis, the cash collateral of AIG was 
invested in long-term and illiquid assets.46 Hence, the exposure of the institution to a 
potential liquidity stress was of a large scale. This tactic had led to positive results in 
the beginning. However, when the crisis came up and the borrowers of its securities 
asked to return the securities to the institution and hence to get their collateral back, 
the need to liquidate some of the companies assets in order to return the cash of the 
borrowers led the company to considerable losses.47 
As far as AIG’s exposure to CDSs is concerned, the following remarks sum up 
the problem. The executives of AIG sustained that their investments related with the 
real estate – i.e. the insurances they provided to mortgage related securities through 
CDSs – would initially experience a downfall in their market value, but their recovery 
would pay off the investment.48 In 2008, though, AIG suffered huge losses, primarily 
in the Financial Services and Life Insurance divisions, those losses deriving from their 
involvement on real estate financial products and from the company’s securities 
lending policy, respectively.49  
 It is sustained that AIG reflects a broader trend, since the financial crisis affected 
the sector of life insurances in its entirety. Pursuant to relevant evidence provided in 
the literature,50 life insurers hold hardly one third of their general account assets in 
securities backed by mortgages or straight held mortgages, whose value deterioration 
within 2008-2009 led some life insurers to their solvency borderline. 
2. Lehman Brothers 
Lehman had a large exposure to almost all the financial products analysed in 
Section II.B.1, in their speculative aspect of use – as illustrated by the results. It is 
widely sustained that Lehman Brothers’ losses from its derivatives – i.e. financial 
products including the CDSs – transactions, were one of the major reasons 
contributing to the liquidation of the institution.51  																																																								
46 Adrian Tobias et al. (2013), n 8, p. 10 
47 Ibid., p. 11 
48 McDonald & Paulson (2015), n 7, p. 82 
49 Ibid., p. 83 
50 Chodorow-Reich (2014), n 25, p. 170 
51 Schooner & Taylor (2010), n 32, p. 47 
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Tobias et al. suggest that the problem with Lehman Brothers was that its creditors 
refused to extend financing for the institution’s repos, due to the rumoured non-
creditworthiness of the institution, when Lehman relied on its repo market 
transactions.52 The problem for the creditors was not the quality of the collateral, 
which logically should have been, as the collateral is the object of the particular 
transaction, but the creditworthiness of Lehman Brothers. This absence of trust 
stemmed from rumours regarding the institutions’ exposure to junk financial products.   
One of the issues causing concerns in the case of Lehman Brothers is that, despite 
that the tri-party repo market in general did not suffer large haircuts – unlike the 
bilateral party, as above53 indicated – this institution did suffer the consequences of 
such losses.54 Lehman Brothers displayed special malfunctioning in the tri-party repo 
market, which has been attributed to its use of repos as a means of ‘accounting 
arbitrage and manipulation of balance sheet results’.55 When this information became 
public, the creditors of Lehman started questioning its creditworthiness and acted 
accordingly. 
It is, as well, sustained that Lehman Brothers suffered huge losses from their 
involvement with the subprime linked securities,56 above57 analysed.  
3. Northern Rock 
When the UK Financial Services Authority (FSA) – now split into two separate 
regulatory authorities, the FCA and the PRA – started to issue warnings for excessive 
risk taking and the problems that could arise out of it, Northern Rock announced that 
it was aware of the warnings. However, it did not make any effort to raise its liquidity 
so as to be able to respond in case of abnormal circumstances.58 The consequence? In 
September 2007 an old-fashioned bank run – the last previous in Britain took place in 
186659 – with massive consequences – which was not intercepted as quickly as 																																																								
52 Adrian Tobias et al. (2013), n 8, p. 8 
53 Section II.B.1.b 
54 Adrian Tobias et al. (2013), n 8, p. 9 
55 Ong & Yeung (2010), n 16, p. 93 
56 Schooner & Taylor (2010), n 32, p. 47 
57 Section II.B.1.c 
58 Arora (2011), n 30, p. 10 
59 Tomasic Roman, ‘Corporate Rescue, Governance and Risk-Taking in Northern Rock: Part 1’ (2008) 
Vol. 29, No. 10 Company Lawyer, p. 297 
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required by the competent authorities – was experienced, after depositors became 
aware of Northern Rock’s application for a loan facility at the Bank of England and 
the announcement of the latter that it would at last provide the liquidity assistance.60 
As in the case of AIG, which without the US Treasury’s assistant would have gone 
bust, the same applied for Northern Rock; the company would not have survived 
without the Bank of England’s rescue. 
The problem with this bank was founded on the fact that a very small amount of 
its liabilities stemmed from retail deposits, whereas the vast majority of funding 
constituted from short-term borrowing in the capital markets and securitised notes, 
along with some other long-term borrowing.61 In fact, despite that Northern Rock was 
not directly exposed to mortgage backed securities, it was indirectly exposed, since it 
was borrowing from ‘financial pools’, which included those problematic products.62 
This entailed the involvement of a company based on a tax haven called Granite, 
which Northern Rock used as its special purpose vehicle (SPV), in order to onsell 
repackaged or securitised mortgages.63 As indicated above64, those securities and the 
mortgage loans themselves were combined with other products of similar or other 
kind and composed pools of funding in the capital markets. Hence, it was difficult to 
assess the exact risks entailed and to value them accordingly. 
In this context, it needs to be underlined that the House of Commons Treasury 
Committee expressly blamed the management of the institution for reckless business 
tactics.65 
D. Criticism on the Risks Undertaken 
Excessive leverage. It is submitted, in brief, that the main characteristic of the 
products so far examined and of the problems they caused to financial institutions is 
leverage.  In particular, the circulation of the above products and policies indicates the 
high amount of credit used within the market, i.e. the fact that the market and, 																																																								
60 Shin Hyun Song, ‘Reflections on Northern Rock: The Bank Run that Heralded the Global Financial 
Crisis’ (2009) Vol. 23, No. 1 The Journal of Economic Perspectives, p. 102 
61 Ibid. 
62 Ibid., p. 102; Tomasic Roman, ‘Corporate Rescue, Governance and Risk-Taking in Northern Rock: 
Part 1’ (2008) Vol. 29, No. 11 Company Lawyer, p. 330 
63 Tomasic (2008), n 62, p. 331 
64 Section II.B.1.c 
65 Tomasic (2011), n 62, p. 330 
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subsequently, all the stakeholders involved were exposed to high amounts of leverage, 
either being leveraged themselves or being exposed to highly leveraged 
counterparties. In fact, Schularick and Taylor have proven that a ‘credit boom’ 
indicates a high risk of financial crisis.66 
It is sustained that in order for the effects, side effects and, at last, possible 
disastrous effects of the above-analysed products and policies to be identified ex ante, 
one needs to approach their scope and mechanism from a disaggregating perspective, 
i.e. to split them into their components and analyse those relevant to the problem. For 
example, in the case of repos and securities lending, there are six key elements that 
need to be particularly examined so that the risk-exposure can be mitigated, i.e. to be 
predicted and addressed timely. Those elements are the maturity, the principal, the 
interest rate, the nature of the collateral, the counterparty and the haircut.67 In fact, the 
maturity of repos and securities lending, when their cash collateral is being 
reinvested, is one of the factors requiring particular attention. 68  The position 
submitted is that, although maturity transformation, i.e. the transformation of long-
term illiquid assets into liquid assets,69 is one of the key functions of financial 
institutions as intermediaries, history shows that it needs to be pursued with more 
attendance as to the effects of possible mismatches in case of abnormal 
circumstances. Maturity transformation took many forms in the years preceding the 
financial crisis, to name but a few: reinvestment of cash collateral to be returned on 
demand, investment in the extremely risky subprime lending policies, etc. In a system 
where financial institutions are interconnected, which holds true in most of the cases, 
the speculative approach of the results of the financial products, taken the form so far 
described, needs to be restricted ex ante. 
Overall, it is clear that the undertaking of risks is inherent in the functioning of 
financial institutions, given that through risk free or low risk products, such as 
government securities, they cannot make the profits necessary for their sustainability. 
In fact, it is fairly submitted that the width of ability of a financial system to make 																																																								
66 Schularick & Taylor (2012), p. 1045 
67 Adrian Tobias et al. (2013), n 8, p. 12 
68 Ibid., p. 11 
69 Lowe Phillip, ‘The transformation in Maturity Transformation’, Address by Mr Philip Lowe, Deputy 
Governor of the Reserve Bank of Australia, to Thomson Reuters’ 3rd Australian Regulatory Summit, 
Sydney, 27 May 2015, p. 1 
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funds available for the running of risky projects is strongly associated with the proper 
functioning of the economy.70 This, however, does not preclude the fact that the risk 
undertaken should not excessively surpass the so-called risk tolerance71 of each 
institution. Thus, financial innovation, in the form of the products above analysed is 
overall positive, however, it cannot be upheld without an at least careful way as to 
addressing risk only where it can be tolerated.72 It is at least wrong to claim that a new 
introduction in the financial market is good or bad, or destructive, based on the mere 
fact that there exists a market for it.73  
In the same vein, it has been sustained that the risks being and having been 
undertaken lie within the normal activities undertaken by those running the day-to-
day business of an institution, including high exposure to credit. This, though, with 
the thought that people relying on the proper functioning of financial institutions, such 
as depositors, shareholders, investors etc., should themselves undertake to monitor 
this functioning. This argument is turned down – among others – by the so-called as 
free riders approach. According to this approach, it is a very expensive task for those 
benefiting from the activities of financial institutions, to spend the time and money to 
monitor decision making, for which they do not even carry the necessary specialised 
knowledge. Due to this, those benefiting – for example the depositors in case of a 
bank – will try to benefit from any monitoring exercised by another depositor and free 
ride, so that only the other spends money and makes effort. Most probably, though, 
all the depositors would think this way and omit monitoring on the basis of the free 
ride approach, i.e. someone else is going to do it for me and I will not to bear the cost 
of it.74 The result would be the absence of monitoring at all. Hence, a formula 
providing for the participation of each stakeholder, taking into account the amount of 
time and the costs tolerable for each of them, could balance the situation. This is the 
approach followed in this work and presented in the relevant section75.  																																																								
70 Committee to Review the Functioning of Financial Institutions, Report (Vol. 1); Presented to 
Parliament by the Prime Minister by Command of her Majesty – June 1980 (first printed 1980, Her 
Majesty’s Stationery Office, London 1983), p. 23 
71 Larcker D. F. et al., ‘Follow the Money: Compensation, Risk and the Financial Crisis’ (2014), 
Stanford Closer Look Series, p. 1 
72 Johnson S. & Kwak J. (2012), n 6, p. 1 
73 Ibid., p. 3 
74 Schooner & Taylor (2010), n 32, p. 32 
75 Section IV 
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III. The Freedoms of the Decision Makers in Association with their 
Contribution to the Problem 
A. The Role of Those Running Financial Institutions Towards a 
Financial Meltdown 
It has been widely sustained – and actually admitted – that Wall Street bankers 
were those who caused, or at least substantially contributed to, the financial crisis.76 
Those bankers upheld highly leveraged bets on mortgage loans, as above analysed. 
They gave wrong incentives with regard to risk undertaking and its association with 
their remuneration; in fact, those two – risk undertaking and remuneration policies – 
separately or in combination are coherently cited as among the primary reasons 
setting the foundation of the crisis.77 
The counter argument on this is that the one to blame is the regulatory system and 
the fact that it has failed to sufficiently capture any risks inherent in the activities 
undertaken.78 Or, in other words, those responsible for decision-making were not 
prevented from undertaking any excessively risky activities. However, couldn’t it be 
argued that they are or should have been ex officio responsible or even liable for any 
of their decisions with predictable harmful effects? To the view of the writer, it is 
invalid to argue that the correct assessment of the risks was impossible, due to the fact 
that the products and policies in circulation were highly rated. In fact, the products 
and policies were intentionally combined and traded in such a way, so as their defects 
to be hidden.79 
There are indicators of whether an institution operates in a proper manner or not. 
One of them is the ability of the institution to renew its long-term funding; if not, then 
there is a potentially problematic situation, which needs particular attention so as to 																																																								
76 For a thorough elaboration on the argument, see Santoro M. A. & Strauss R. J., Wall Street Values 
(Cambridge University Press, USA, 2012), Chapter 2 (pp. 27-58). 
77 Larcker et al. (2014), n 71, p. 1; Caywood Steven C., ‘Wasting the Corporate Waste Doctrine: How 
the Doctrine Can Provide a Viable Solution in Controlling Excessive Executive Compensation’ (2010) 
Vol. 109, No. 1 Michigan Law Review, p. 115; Arora (2011), n 30, p. 3 
78 Pooran Priya Nandita, ‘Macro-prudential supervision – a panacea for the global financial crisis?’ 
(2009) Vol. 3, No. 6 Law and the Financial Markets Review, p. 534 
79 The trading of Collateralised Debt Obligations (CDOs), i.e. structured financial products combined 
by a pool of low to very highly risky loans, however rated on average, inflicted huge losses for 
financial institutions trading them. They were accused of triggering the subprime mortgages crisis. 
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be reversed or so that the institution can unwind in an orderly manner, without 
causing the side effects to those interconnected. 80 This predictability and subsequent 
action taking lie within the capacity of those running the institutions. However, a 
substantial problem with those people’s presence in those institutions is the fact that it 
is temporary. In this context, the notion of their moral hazard comes into play. 
Especially as far as banks are concerned, one also needs to take into consideration 
the fact that they fund their investments, and thus make money, by putting other 
people’s money, i.e. the money of their depositors, at risk. Therefore, any sort of 
financial innovation, such as that in the form of the above-analysed products, should 
be pursued by means of an economically productive – and not just speculative – use 
of the savings.81 It is sustained that the restricted liability of banks’ shareholders for 
the liabilities upheld and their short-term presence in each institution – since their 
shares are traded, provide for incentives to decision makers to undertake excessive 
risks. This observation is made on the basis that shareholders normally benefit from 
risk taking with short-term effects, unlike, of course, the depositors who are – most of 
the times – to pay the bill in case of an accident, bank runs, extensive loan losses 
etc.82 On the other hand, though, even the shareholders do not benefit only from the 
short-term effects of such initiatives, because when they retain their shares for a 
longer time, they are exposed as well to the dangers of speculative investments, as the 
value of their shares fluctuates, shrinks or disappears in case of uncontrollable 
accidents. In fact, excessive exposure to risks by short-termism and excessive 
leverage leads on the one hand, to a risk of illiquidity, due to the 
maturity/transformation gap, and, on the other hand, to a risk of insolvency, given that 
financial institutions’ balance sheets are highly leveraged. 
B. Remuneration Policies 
Some specific observations, regarding the remuneration of those running financial 
institutions, facilitate a better understanding of the reason why such speculative risks 
were undertaken.  
																																																								
80 Adrian Tobias et al. (2013), n 8, p. 11 
81 Johnson & Kwak (2012), n 6, p. 3 
82 Schooner & Taylor (2010), n 32, p. 22 
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In January 2008, the five biggest investment banks of Wall Street announced that 
they were paying $39 billion in bonuses for 2007. Year 2007, though, was a year of 
substantial losses with many of the losses to be covered by shareholders.83 It is 
sustained that the huge salaries of those running financial institutions were not 
questioned, despite the fact that they were obviously not coherent with what business 
morality and individual performance results indicate. Contrariwise, in 2008 – when 
the effects of false and speculative tactics were becoming obvious – institutions 
retained the belief that they would soon recover into business.84 
In this sense, financial instability and huge losses within financial institutions 
were – to a very large extent – connected to, first, the non-reasonable excessive risk 
taking; second, the incentives of those undertaking the risks;85 third the absence of 
interconnection of those two with the results for financial institutions in the long- or 
short-term. In fact, the years leading to the financial crisis, banks, or more precisely 
their decision makers, were allowed to resort to excessive risks, much larger than their 
balance sheets could bear. All the more, all those have been approved by the 
regulators, in view of the enlargement of banks.86 
It needs to be underlined that in the vast majority of cases the decision makers are 
those deciding for their own remunerations; in this context, they value their initiatives 
on their own and in most of the cases they do not need to account at all for the 
remuneration they receive for their services. Even in cases where the remunerations 
are voted upon, thus they are supposedly examined at a certain extent, the applicable 
system is not effective. The latter given that the remuneration committees are too 
often composed from non-executive directors, who serve the interests of those being 
highly remunerated.87  
C. Longevity of the Institution: Are Their Decision Makers 
Concerned? 
Extremities in salaries being non-justifiable on the basis of the pay-for-
performance approach lie among the roots of major past financial scandals, such as 																																																								
83 Chorafas (2009), n 3, p. 157 
84 Ibid., p. 158 
85 Larcker et al. (2014), n 71, p. 1 
86 Johnson & Kwak (2012), n 6, p. 9 
87 Arora (2011), n 30, p. 7 
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those of Enron, Adelphia and Tyco.88 After those cases, the situation with regard to 
issues such as transparency changed considerably. Remuneration of and the overall 
estimation towards decision makers of major institutions shrank, with a subsequent 
shrinking of their so long empowered responsibilities.89 This reversion, though, did 
not last for too long, since they managed to restore their ‘superpowers’. 
As for the decision makers of financial institutions of nowadays – and of the 
years leading to the financial crisis – and whether they should be particularly 
concerned for the long-term results of their policies, it is sustained that they are 
actually provided with incentives to cater for the opposite. In fact, Chorafas writes 
that the major participants of the financial world are getting away with any adverse 
effects against other people’s money, caused by the risks they undertake; they get 
compensated with extravagant numbers, even when the companies employing them 
may have lost billions.90 
Johnson and Kwak’s phrase summarises in the best way the interest of executives, 
directors and any of those managing the risky products and distributing them to the 
market: ‘By the time risks materialise, the decision makers in question may be long 
gone’.91 
After the results of the financial crisis became apparent, the notion of macro-
prudential supervision came into the forefront, thus depicting in the most illustrative 
way possible that short-termism so far was the adopted practice for the business plans 
of the financial institutions. In fact, macro-prudential supervision introduces a new 
pre-emptive approach to supervision: it aims at preventing risks not only for 
individual institutions, but also for the whole system, so as to deter systemic risks and 
the subsequent possible financial booms.92 In this regard, it should be stressed that 
systemic risks and their subsequent contagion effects are strongly underlined by 
leading authorities as a field that requires special attention and more prudent 
regulation.93 																																																								
88 Chorafas (2009), n 3, p. 159 
89 Ibid., p. 161 
90 Ibid., p. 161 
91 Johnson & Kwak (2012), n 6, p. 7 
92 Pooran (2009), n 78, p. 535 
93 Goodhart C.A.E, ‘The regulatory response to the financial crisis’ (2008) Volume 4, Issue 4 Journal 
of Financial Stability, p. 356; Lastra Rosa M., International Financial and Monetary Law (second 
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IV. Notions on the Current Status of Liability of Decision Makers 
A. Is There Any Noticeable Realisation of the Individual Fault? 
An account conducted in 2009 revealed that the losses in the assets of life 
insurance companies, due to their involvement with subprime loans reached $180 
billions, followed by their subsequent substantial degradation by rating agencies.94 
This obviously affected severely the shareholders, but not the CEOs or other decision 
makers, who, on the contrary – and as above indicated – received huge bonuses and 
remunerations for their services. 
As already indicated, it is the excessive risk that constitutes the cause of the 
problem that is the degradation of the financial status of financial institutions. 
However, undertaking risks is an inherent function of decision makers’ position in a 
financial institution, otherwise they do not make profits and, thus, they shrink. This 
being said, one could argue that the crucial point to be determined is the borderline 
between the acceptable risk and the excessive risk. However, how could one 
distinguish between those two?  
Larcker et al. argue that one helpful indicator is the risk leading to the maximum 
downside that an institution can bear.95 In the same vein, they sustain that a way 
through which the undertaken risk could be restricted is by an initiative of the 
regulators to restrict the amount of leverage that a financial institution can raise.96 
Additionally, the restriction of the incentives provided to decision makers to take up 
risks constitutes another efficient measure.97 
Regarding the products described in Section II.B.1 and the problems they caused 
to the global financial system, it has been sustained that those to blame are the 
investors and not the issuers and the traders. However, one needs to underline that 
those products were to such an extent risky, that if investors – rational investors at 
least – were able to assess the risks inherent, probably they would not have invested 
																																																																																																																																																														
edition, Oxford University Press, USA, 2015), p. 181; Lastra Rosa M., ‘Do We Need a World 
Financial Organisation’ (2014) Vol. 17 Journal of International Economic Law, p. 789 
94 Chodorow-Reich (2014), n 25, p. 170 
95 Larcker et al. (2014), n 71, p. 3 
96 Ibid, p. 4 
97 Ibid., p. 4 
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in them.98 The market, including the financial institutions, was at a certain extent 
misled when dealing with the products above examined, given that – among others – 
they were misleadingly rated, which rendered their evaluation very difficult. 
The international financial community seems to have at least underlined the 
problem, but are there any substantial efforts to deal with it?  
B. Initiatives Undertaken 
The presentation of the initiatives undertaken so far in the context of restricting 
any possible destructive effects of any speculative initiatives is indicative. Hence, the 
present work deals with the relevant framework of two jurisdictions and more 
particularly with a couple of practices adopted to deal with the problem.  
An initial comment stemming from the analysis below is that there is no 
established liability framework in case of excessive and destructive risk taking on the 
part of decision makers of financial institutions. There exist only some mere efforts 
towards the minimisation of any future problems, which, to the view presented in this 
paper, cannot sufficiently mitigate wrong incentives and initiatives. An indicative 
presentation of them is made in order to illustrate how the framework now stands. 
1. United States of America  
Executives’ high compensations were called into question even at the end of the 
years of the Great Depression in 1941. 99 Hence, the fact that complete freedom with 
regard to the decision makers’ remuneration could lead to disastrous side effects did 
not come out of the blue within the financial history. 
After the recent crisis has evolved and its severe effects for the US and for the 
global economy became more than apparent, the Obama Administration decided to 
undertake initiatives. Thus, in 2010, the so-called as Dodd-Frank legislation came 
into being. Despite the need for further elaboration by the regulators, it is submitted 
that this legislation constitutes the most comprehensive and biggest financial 
regulatory reform since the Great Depression.100 As for the further elaboration and 																																																								
98 Johnson & Kwak (2012), n 6, p. 5 
99 Caywood (2010), n 77, p. 112 
100 Morrison & Foerster, ‘The Dodd-Frank Act: A Cheat Sheet’, Morrison & Foerster (2010), p. 2; 
Parker Edm. & Gupta M., ‘Too Much Regulation Creates Bank Brain Grain’ (October 18, 2015), 
Financial Times 
Financial products and practices, excessive risk taking and the liability of decision makers of financial 
institutions; lessons learned from the financial crisis 
Sonia	I.	Saranti	(1104140043)	
International	Hellenic	University	LLM	–	Intake:	October	2014	
28	
specialisation required, the legislation provides for necessary studies and significant 
rulemaking by commissions, such as the Commodity Futures Trading Commission 
(“CFTC”), the Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) and by various Federal-
banking regulators.101 This legislation includes regulations specifically oriented to 
financial institutions, but it also consists of provisions regarding risk taking and 
executive compensation practices.  
As far as the provisions regarding risk taking are concerned, the legislation 
introduces provisions and proposals for further initiatives, such as obligatory risk 
retention by the securitiser (Section 941) and special committees for auditing (Section 
989G) that the financial institutions abide by the established framework. Disclosure 
requirements are getting more demanding and thorough as well. As far as those 
issuing the products entailing risk are concerned, due diligence obligations are also 
introduced. More directed, though, to the notion of liability is Title VII of the Dodd-
Frank Act, known as Wall Street Transparency and Accountability Act of 2010, which 
establishes a decisive framework regarding derivatives and market participants.102 
As for the pre-existent framework in the US, it is sustained that there was 
traditionally a mechanism through which, the shareholders of a corporation – this 
notion including financial institutions as well – can raise the so-called as “waste 
claim”, on the basis of the corporate waste doctrine. This doctrine introduces that a 
shareholder can claim against the board of directors of a company, on the basis of 
wasting company assets.103 In this context, Caywood writes that a waste is identified 
in case there is no concrete correspondence among the bonus payment and the results 
of the service provided.104 However, this action has only rarely been evoked.  
In the same context, the Dodd Frank Act (Section 957) legislation endorses the 
say-on-pay principle in the sense of a non-binding vote from the shareholders for their 
executives’ compensation.105 Within the US and after the rise and effects of the recent 
financial crisis, the notion of the say-on-pay has as well been established in the 
Corporate and Financial Institution Compensation Fairness Act of 2009 (hereinafter 																																																								
101 Morrison & Foerster (2010), n 100, p. 10 
102 Ibid. 
103 Caywood (2010), n 77, p. 114 
104 Ibid., p. 117 
105 Morrison & Foerster (2010), n 100, p. 23 
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2009 Act). In the same way as in the Dodd Frank Act, what causes the inefficiency of 
the 2009 Act is that even there the say-on-pay is not binding for the directors, but only 
advisory; this, however does not mean that it does not constitute a step at all, since it 
provides the shareholders with the ability to undertake some action.106 Hemphill and 
Lillevik argue that the say-on-pay policy can function properly as a means of 
substantial control exercised by the shareholders, if the effective proxy access is 
enabled as well.107 With this thought in mind, it is submitted that a more multiple-
sided approach is required for the system to reach the required results. 
2. United Kingdom  
It is sustained that the first legislation addressing the issues of accountability, 
transparency, and performance linkage was established in the UK in 2002 under the 
title ‘The Directors' Remuneration Report Regulations’. 108  According to this 
legislation, the shareholders should non-bindingly vote on the directors’ previous and 
next year remuneration, when it comes to publicly traded companies, including 
financial institutions. Hence, a form of the say-on-pay policy is provided in the UK. 
The basis of the framework, though, regarding how decisions shall be taken 
within the financial institutions in the UK is enshrined in Section 172 of the 
Companies Act 2006. This provision sets out the duty of directors to promote the 
success of their institutions, in the form of the duty to act in good faith when 
performing their duties. The measure of success is not addressed in the Act, but it is 
sustained that the reference is made for the long-term amelioration in the value of the 
shares of the company.109 
As for the initiatives undertaken in the UK after the financial crisis, the Walker 
Report (November 2009), introduced by Sir David Walker, is considered as one of the 
most concrete steps towards a change of the corporate governance as to the 
elimination of undertaking excessive risks. The report proposes board level risk and 
remuneration committees. 110  Overall, it is sustained that this piece of work 																																																								
106 Caywood (2010), n 77, p. 123 
107  Hemphill Th. A. & Lillevik W., ‘US "say-on-pay" legislation: is it corporate governance 
overreach?’ (2009) Vol. 51, No. 2 International Journal of Law Management, p. 105 
108 Ibid., p. 109 
109 Arora (2011), n 30, p. 8 
110 Telegraph Staff, ‘Walker Review: The Main Points’ (July 16, 2009), telegraph.co.uk  
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acknowledges the importance of the effective communication and interaction among 
the companies – thus entailing financial institutions as well – and their 
shareholders.111 
Along with the above, the FSA Principles for Businesses (2009) apply. After the 
split of the FSA, the Prudential Regulation Authority administers those principles. All 
regulated firms are obliged to abide by those rules. In this context, Principle 3 writes 
that ‘A firm must take reasonable care to organise and control its affairs responsibly 
and effectively, with adequate risk management systems’.112 Arguably, the wording of 
this principle does not impose any particular obligation that could be rendered 
effective so as to eliminate any risk taking. Anyone can evoke that he has applied a 
vaguely prudential policy, based on his point of view on making business. Such 
provisions constitute mere euphemisms, absent specific obligations on risk 
measurement, along with a mechanism that could evaluate the measure of risk, 
specifying who carries the burden for any decision. The fact that the FSA has fined 
Citigroup Global Markets on the basis of this principle, evoking a trading strategy 
that has manipulated the trading in the bond market113 does not offer too much 
towards the elimination of speculative practices. The reason is that this decision did 
not offer a measure for the decision makers so that they are aware of when they will 
possibly be fined. This could either lead to indifference towards the principle, or to 
possible restricted risk undertaking to an extent harmful for the welfare of companies. 
V. The Proposal  
A. Introductory Notes 
To begin with, it should be recalled that the overall viewpoint enshrined in this 
paper regarding the proper functioning of the market and, in the same vein, the 
options provided to the market’s stakeholders – including financial institutions – is a 
liberal one. In this regard, there is no intention to make any submissions for 
moralities, equality within the society and resources’ distribution. However, it is 																																																								
111 Arora (2011), n 30, p. 6 
112 Prudential Regulation Authority, ‘Principles for Businesses; The Principles’ (06.06.2014), 
fsahandbook.info 
113 Arora (2011), n 30, p. 15 
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sustained that the current stagnant situation, where there is no automatic adjustment to 
changes and senior executives are able to disrespect the need for proper and long-term 
functioning of the market and undertake destructive risks, is absolutely outside the 
notion of liberalism and the way it should be functioning. As Goodhart recently 
argued, some changes with regard to remunerations of those running the financial 
institutions should be made, so as failure to become more ‘painful’.114 In any event, 
regulatory changes are necessary towards the incentives provided for decision makers 
to take up risks.115 
It is suggested that the institutions’ decision makers could be considered acting as 
‘freelancers’ providing their services, since they undertake different positions every 
now and then. In fact, the huge bonuses and salaries under examination were 
provided, on the basis of the fear of institutions – such as Goldman Sachs and Morgan 
Stanley, who were paying the lion’s shares – not to lose their traders and investment 
bankers to other competitors to whom they would easily move.116 Those decision 
makers should carry the burden of their freedom of expensive initiatives, when those 
initiatives are not prudent. It is submitted that this burden should take the form of 
liability for civil wrong. 
A proactive approach amounting to a procedure before any liability claim can be 
raised against a decision maker is favoured here. To the writer’s view, this approach 
could function very much in favour of prudent decision makers of financial 
institutions. In fact, vague rules regarding issues associated with liability could 
detrimentally affect those acting reasonably, unlike a more specific framework. This 
framework summarises as follows: on the one hand, it aims at mitigating any negative 
financial results as many issues could be prevented by alarming those involved; on the 
other hand, the aim is the protection of prudent decision makers, in the sense that if 
they follow any well formulated system, they do not need to be afraid of reputation 
and financial damage, due to claims stemming out of nowhere. It needs to be 
underlined that this dissertation proposes both a substantial and a procedural 
framework to lead to decision makers’ liability. 																																																								
114 Goodhart C.A.E, ‘The parlous state of macroeconomics and the optimal financial structure’ (2014) 
Vol. 36 International Review of Financial Analysis, p. 83 
115 Persaud (2015), n 2, p. 153 
116 Chorafas (2009), n 3, p. 160 
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B. The Substantial Framework 
Regarding the substantial requirement, it is recalled that there is the need for a 
proactive approach with regard to the incentives provided for decision makers to 
undertake any risks in view of the longevity of financial institutions. Α tighter 
connection with the long-term effects of their “financial creations or tools” should be 
established. However, this proactive approach should not pose them in a restrictive 
framework of tight regulation and auditing, due to potential adverse effects for their 
efficiency. It is illustrative, that even when the last words of this paper were being 
drafted, the press highlighted an increasing tendency of highly experienced 
individuals moving from large institutions to areas were lighter regulation applies, 
such as investment funds.117  
One could evoke, in this sense, that the evaluation of long-term results should not 
be the only focus, given that some of those products have short-term effects of 
considerable value, which cannot be ignored. However, their interconnection with 
other products (for example the interconnection between CDSs and asset-backed 
securities backed by subprime loans) can in the long-term result in disastrous and 
easily predictable effects for financial institutions or the global economy as a whole. 
This is the context, wherein the Basel Committee or any other forum able to create 
impact and lead states to decisive initiatives should establish a framework with global 
effects, without the worldwide lobbies’ influence and on the basic thought that the 
global finances are unbreakably linked.  
But apart from numerical barriers and weights set as regulatory standards which, 
first, can be manipulated – given, among others, the growing innovation in the 
financial world – and, second, cannot control situations where the results of bad 
policies are only identified in the long-term, the notion of reckless behaviour has been 
introduced and cited in juridical decisions. This notion is supported in this dissertation 
as it provides a basis to furnish the discussion and the decisions needed, so as to 
tackle reckless risk taking. According to the relevant case law, a reckless person is the 
one performing within‘(i) a circumstance when he is aware of a risk that exists or will 
exist; (ii) a result when he is aware of a risk that it will occur; and it is, in the 
																																																								
117 Parker & Gupta (2015), n 100 
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circumstances known to him, unreasonable to take the risk’.118 It is submitted that – 
as already stated – it is not reasonable to blame those responsible for the day-to-day 
businesses of an institution for any shortfall. However, in case the above criteria of 
recklessness apply, then this could act as a core component towards any accusation 
against them. However, it is very difficult to capture the cases where those 
characteristics can indeed be identified. Specific procedures complementing the 
notion of recklessness should be established to substantiate a liability claim, 
especially given the particular character of the initiatives financial institutions’ 
decision makers undertake, i.e. the ongoing outline of the products they are dealing 
with. A proposal for those procedures is described in the following section. 
C. The Procedural Framework 
As already inferred, those running a financial institution should be obliged to 
underline the dangers enshrined in whatever they introduce in the market, so that 
those paying the bill are able to decide on the new product-entries or their blockage 
from the global market.  
A first tool to efficiently deter decision makers from recklessly taking decisions – 
in the sense that their rewards will be judged – is the proper functioning of the say-on-
pay principle. Shareholders should be able to approve or dismiss the proposed 
managers’ compensations before their distribution. This principle is also inherent in 
the Dodd Frank Act (Section 951) legislation above119 analysed and – in some sense – 
in the relevant UK legislation. It has also been suggested that decision makers should 
not have a say at all on their remunerations.120 As already argued, though, this choice 
is problematic in the sense that a higher burden is imposed on shareholders, who may 
hold only a small amount of shares, given the regular partition of share and who most 
probably do not carry the necessary expertise. The proper formula for say-on-pay 
would require representatives of groups of shareholders according to the type of 
shares held, so that the relevant interests to be represented efficiently. It is sustained 
that, even though the point of view of the shareholders will be addressed, it will not 																																																								
118 Regina v G and another [2004] 1 AC 1034, para 41; Roberts T. A. & Wilkins A. and The Financial 
Conduct Authority [2015] UKUT 0408 (TCC), para 48 
119 Section IV.B.1 
120 Hillier David et al., Financial Markets and Corporate Governance (2nd European edition, McGraw-
Hill Education, Berkshire UK, 2012), p. 589 
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be decisive. Shareholders normally have neither the necessary qualifications nor the 
financial means to assess properly the policies and, consequently, the remunerations 
based on policies’ performance. However, most executives know that if shareholders 
disapprove of remunerations, the remunerations and/or the policies of the institution 
should change, which provides a motive for higher performances.121 
Clawback provisions constitute a second tool with potential to restrict speculative 
initiatives within financial institutions. Those provisions are included in directors’ 
contracts and provide for the recovering of benefits granted to them, under the 
circumstances specified in their contracts. They can be agreed upon either 
prospectively or retrospectively to the decision makers’ harmful decisions.122 It 
should be argued, though, that the choice of a retrospective (to the reckless behaviour) 
instead of prospective clawback provision is not efficient. The reason is that, if 
retrospective clawback provisions applied, decision makers would have been unaware 
of the fact that such clauses are going to be agreed upon; hence, they would not 
change their practices, before they undertake the excessively risky initiatives. As a 
consequence, the problematic results would not have been deterred. On the other 
hand, when clawback provisions are agreed upon before any problematic decision-
making (prospective clawback provisions), directors are more attentive on what they 
do, in view of the effects they may suffer on their remuneration.123 It should be 
underlined that any recoveries based on clawback provisions most of the times do not 
suffice to compensate the whole damages caused to institutions. However, the aim of 
these provisions is primarily the avoidance of the damage, and secondarily – but 
importantly as well – the return of the remuneration provided for the harmful 
initiatives.   
Clawback provisions should be introduced, because, first, they embody the 
proactive approach to be established as a lesson learned from the financial crisis and 
its roots. Second, it is suggested that prospective clawback provisions can serve as 
one of the bases upon which a waste claim could be raised. In fact, they could be 
established as an indicator for the decision makers that their decisions will be 
reviewed, if proven faulty. Caywood submits that it is unlikely that waste claims can 																																																								
121 Hudgson Paul, ‘Surpise surprise: Say on Pay appears to be working’ (July 8, 2015), FORTUNE 
122 Caywood (2010), n 77, p. 125 
123 Ibid., p. 126 
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be raised and accepted, when prospective clawback provisions exist, because they 
prevent the intentional waste.124 It is argued that this is not correct. A clawback 
provision per se cannot deter managers with intention to act recklessly; it can only 
warn them for the consequences of any harm they cause. 
Based on the arguments already introduced, it is submitted that say-on-pay and 
clawback provisions may provide ‘early warnings’ to policy makers, which may give 
substance to waste claims and make it easier to exercise them with success. This 
corresponds not only to the need for some proactive provisions and procedures, so as 
directors to be deterred from undertaking destructive speculative initiatives, but also 
to the liberal approach, on the basis of which the market participants should be 
allowed to undertake the risks they consider profitable, without this leading to their 
total immunity from the results of their actions. In this sense, it is sustained that what 
is required is the introduction of a mechanism to be adjusted to the separate 
jurisdictions, according to their legal culture. The say-on-pay vote of the shareholders 
should remain non-decisive for the decision makers of the institutions. The reason is 
that indeed the decision makers are those able to assess the risks they undertake and 
need to be able to undertake any risk they consider as profitable, to the extent they 
consider them profitable. However, in case shareholders have expressed their state of 
mind against the risk to be undertaken, then they need to be provided with the ability 
to raise a waste claim, substantiated first on the basis of a reckless behaviour and, 
second, on the fact that decision makers have been warned by either a negative say-
on-pay or a clawback provision in decision makers’ contracts. 
As already mentioned, the substantial requirement for raising those claims is the 
reckless behaviour of the decision makers. However, this recklessness could in 
practice be established on any expressed negative opinion by the shareholders, in the 
context of their say-on-pay. This does not mean that a waste claim could be raised 
only if there was any say-on-pay or clawback provisions in decision makers’ 
contracts. However, if these prerequisites hold, it is much easier for waste claims to 
be substantiated and thrive. 
One could argue that one problematic factor is that when the final results of the 
speculative initiatives of directors will come up, some of the directors will most 																																																								
124 Caywood (2010), n 77, p. 126 
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probably have been away. This being said, the writer sustains that in order for the 
various national or regional frameworks on the subject to be efficient, it shall be 
provided that this shareholders’ right can be exercised within certain time frames after 
the reckless behaviour has taken place, no matter whether the decision makers 
responsible still run the institution or not. The same should also apply to the clawback 
provisions, in the sense that the shareholders or any other person having legal interest 
should be able to raise waste claims, based on clawback provisions, even when 
decision makers are out of a specific institution, when the results of his activities 
come out.  
Some further notions upon which the liability of decision makers could be 
established, refer to two main ideas: first, the disclosure of financial investments, 
especially – but not exclusively – when they admittedly entail higher risks125 – a 
notion to be elaborated in decision makers’ contracts and, second, the firm 
establishment of the due diligence approach.126 It is sustained that the notion of due 
diligence is in a sense inherent in or the other side of the same coin of the notion of 
recklessness. As for disclosure requirements, it is underlined that some of the most 
severe problems in the financial system were caused because of lack of proper 
international disclosure of information to supervisory authorities. AIG constitutes one 
of the most characteristic examples. In fact, the one who at last undertook AIG’s 
rescue was the US Federal Government. However, the British and not the US 
regulatory authorities mainly regulated AIG’s financial products’ exposure, even 
though the burden of an AIG being too big to fail was carried in the US.127 
Finally, regarding the observation that a tighter procedural framework could make 
it more difficult for waste claims to be raised, it is submitted that, first, the proposal in 
this paper aims to a better structured, rather than tighter framework. Second, the 
proposed framework suggests that when specific prerequisites hold, then the waste 
claim could be easier substantiated.  
																																																								
125 Johnson S. & Kwak J. (2012), n 6, p. 7 
126 Fox Merritt B., ‘Civil Liability and Mandatory Disclosure’ (2009) Vol. 109, No. 2 Columbia Law 
Review 
127 Garicano L. & Lastra R. M., ‘Towards A New Architecture For Financial Stability: Seven 
Principles’ (2010) Vol. 13, No. 3 Journal of International Economic Law, p. 607 
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VI.  Conclusions 
This thesis submits that there is a coherence between speculative initiatives 
inherent in the issuance and circulation of some financial products and policies, the 
incentives provided to directors of financial institutions for excessive risk taking and 
the liability of the financial institutions’ decision makers. This liability could be 
founded upon the harm caused by excessive risk. In a properly organised legal 
system, when there is loss caused by a harmful behaviour and not by accident, 
somebody should be held liable. 
This paper provides for a presentation of how both in substantial, as well as in 
procedural terms the liability of those decision makers for the harm they cause could 
be established. There is currently a tendency towards more prescriptive rules, rather 
than general principles, when it comes to the regulatory framework of financial 
institutions. However, despite any regulatory limits and barriers to risk, reckless 
behaviour still threatens the system. The necessity of mechanisms such as a broad 
acceptance and adjustment of the notion of recklessness in the context examined, the 
proper establishment of the say-on-pay principle and the clawback provisions along 
with an outline of how those mechanisms could operate combined are dealt with in 
this thesis. In fact, as argued in Section V of the present, say-on-pay principle and 
clawback provisions can serve as precautions of reckless behaviour for decision 
makers. If this reckless behaviour is at last identified, then the mechanism of waste 
claims can be triggered, so as that decision makers are held liable for their damaging 
initiatives.  
It is submitted that future in-depth analysis should be conducted regarding the 
interconnection of the key players in the world of finance and regarding the role 
liability issues could play in the prevention of speculative risk within the financial 
market. An association with the principal agent problem, so as to involve all the 
stakeholders in the solution of the problem could also be addressed.   
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